La collezione dei bronzi del Museo Civico Medievale di Bologna
San Casciano V. P., 2017; paperback, pp. 402, col. plates, cm 21,5x30.
cover price: € 150.00
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La collezione dei bronzi del Museo Civico Medievale di Bologna
San Casciano V. P., 2017; paperback, pp. 402, col. plates, cm 21,5x30.
FREE (cover price: € 150.00)
Petrosa. Un insediamento dell'età del bronzo a Sesto Fiorentino
Vinci, 1994; paperback, pp. 114, 29 b/w ill., 16 col. ill., cm 17x24.
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Bronzi e Pietre Dure nelle Incisioni di Valerio Belli Vicentino
Edited by Tubi Ravalli C.
Ferrara, 2004; bound, pp. 215, b/w and col. ill., cm 26x31.
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L'industria artistica del bronzo del Rinascimento a Venezia e nell'Italia settentrionale
Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi, Venezia - Fondazione Giorgio Cini, October 23 - October 24, 2007.
Edited by Avery V. and Ceriana M.
Translation by Ermini G.
Trento, 2008; paperback, pp. 480, b/w ill., cm 21,5x29.
(Pubblicazioni del Comitato Nazionale per le celebrazioni del 550° anniversario della nascita di Tullio Lombardo).
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Philosophy of selfdeception
Edizioni ETS
English Text.
Pisa, 2013; paperback, pp. 316, cm 14x21.
(HumanaMente).
series: HumanaMente
ISBN: 88-467-3577-3 - EAN13: 9788846735775
Subject: Magazines
Languages:
Weight: 0.65 kg
It is thus easy to get caught up in the attempt to analyse it as to the best of our ability, so as to have a coherent description of it, and also a convincing explanation as to why human beings embark on it at all. It is also tempting to believe that, if we can come up with such a description, and such an explanation, we might perhaps be better equipped to identify its occurrence in ourselves and others, and so, possibly, also try to overcome it. This may be the hope we might want to ascribe to those who believe that self-deception is not a good thing. Other people, however, consider self-deception bliss, by virtue of its allegedly evolutionary, or simply individual, advantages.
Although it was notably described by Donald Davidson1, in the early days of the debate, as an intentional attempt at deceiving oneself, in the hope, among other things, of distinguishing it from other, non-intentional forms of motivated irrationality, many people subscribed later on to the anti-intentional view of self-deception promoted by Al Mele (2001), now also referred to as _motivationalism_, as Mele replaces the explanatory hypothesis of an intention to deceive oneself with a more palatable, paradox-free explanatory account in which a motivational state, mainly a desire, triggers self-deception and explains it convincingly. After Mele's seminal work, the debate has flourished greatly, and many other related, and vital questions, the way to which was fully paved by Mele's research and the subsequent discussion, have been tackled.
Many of these questions have been brilliantly addressed anew by the authors who have contributed to this issue, but other, brand-new ones have also been posed and argued for.